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ARTICLE
REAL PROPERTY: FOR CONNOISSEURS OF THE
PREPOSTEROUS - WHEN IS IT A CAPITAL ASSET?1
MICHAEL S. WEINER°
T HE TAX APPROACH TO PROFIT REALIZED from the sale or exchange of
real property involves a complex determination of whether it is to be
treated as ordinary income or a capital gain. This problem has plagued
the practitioner for more than fifty years, and has produced a volumi-
nous body of case law. Developments in recent years have resulted in
some clarification, yet to a certain extent, decisions have merely compli-
cated what was already complex.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
To oversimplify for the purpose of introduction, a capsulized outline
of the problem will be helpful. If the taxpayer is a dealer in real estate,
he holds land in the same manner as a grocer holds groceries on his
shelves. Accordingly, like the grocer, the real estate dealer should re-
port his profits on the realty sales as ordinary income. On the other
hand, if the taxpayer holds land in the same manner that an investor
holds stocks and bonds, the profit on the disposition of those assets has
a different character, the taxpayer deserving capital gains treatment.
Congress has long recognized that the profits on the sale of an invest-
ment are significantly different from the income produced by the sale of
goods. Since 1921 capital gains have been taxed at a considerably lower
rate than ordinary income. 2
The above phrasing of the issue is technically misleading. The treat-
ment of the gain does not depend upon the status of the taxpayer/
seller as a dealer or an investor, but upon the character of the real prop-
erty sold.3 If the real property sold is a "capital asset," the profit is a
B.A., Washington & Jefferson College; J.D., Univ. of Michigan; Member, Ohio Bar.
To obtain capital gains treatment, one must make a great show of having been
thinking of something else ....
This branch of the income tax laws . . . should be of great interest to those
whom H.L. Mencken used to call "connoisseurs of the preposterous."
Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915, 926 (Ct. Cl.) (Nichols, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 824 (1968).
2 A number of rationales have been offered to explain the differing treatment. Some
authorities argue that such profit is not truly income. Others have stated that it would
be inequitable to tax in one year the appreciation in value that had occurred over a period
of time. Lastly, there may be economic benefits in maximizing the turnover of capital
investments. See MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CODE COMMENTARY
[1955-1973 Transfer Binder] §§ 1201-1241:1 at 3, 4 (1969).
3 A number of commentators have viewed the issue in terms of the dealer/investor
dichotomy. Beck, Berkowitz, Kohl & Schlesinger, The Situation of the Investor-Dealer,
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capital gain; if the real property sold is something other than a capital as-
set (e.g., inventory), the profit is ordinary income. The issue is more
appropriately labeled the capital/non-capital asset problem as opposed
to the dealer/investor problem.
Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines the term
capital asset by exception; all property held by a taxpayer is a capital as-
set except those items specifically listed.4  The majority of the excep-
tions, however, do not concern the classification of real property as a
capital asset. A second term related to the definition of capital asset
is "property used in the trade or business" of the taxpayer contained
in Section 1231(b). 5 Such property combines the best of both worlds:
N.Y.U. 26Tm INsT. ON FED. TAX. 261 (1968); Herzberg, Dealer or Investor?, 37 TAXES
155 (1959); Higgins, The Dealer Taint in Real Estate and How to Avoid It, 7 TAXATION
Foe AccouNT'rArrs 98 (1971); Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate -- "Dealer" v.
"Investor" Problem, 11 TAX L. REV. 157 (1956).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. [Hereinafter cited as CODE].
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include -
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in
his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memo-
randum, or similar property, held by -
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer
for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part
by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in para-
graph (1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State
or Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia,
issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without in-
terest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
5 CODE, § 1231(b).
(1) General Rule -- The term "property used in the trade or business" means
property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the al-
lowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held for more than 6 months,
and real property used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months,
which is not --
(A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the in-
ventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year,
(B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business, or
(C) a copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition, a letter or
memorandum, or similar property, held by a taxpayer described in para-
graph (3) of section 1221.
(2) Timber, Coal, or Domestic Iron Ore -- Such term includes timber, coal,
and iron ore with respect to which section 631 applies.
(3) Livestock -- Such term includes --
(A) cattle and horses, regardless of age, held by the taxpayer for draft,
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if the property is sold at a profit, the profit is treated as a capital gain;
if the sale results in a loss, the loss is an ordinary loss fully deductible
in the year of sale. This term, like capital asset, is also defined by nega-
tion. Exceptions common to both capital assets and property used in a
taxpayer's trade or business include a certain type of copyright; literary,
musical or artistic composition; inventory; and property held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer's trade or business.6
As a result of this statutory scheme, (i.e., definition by exception), it
is necessary to study what is not a capital asset to determine the appro-
priate classification of a given item.7 Obviously, of the exceptions com-
mon to Sections 1221 and 1231, the two which may exclude real estate
from being defined as a capital asset or property used in a taxpayer's
trade or business are the exceptions of inventory and property held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of one's trade or
business. An historical review of these exceptions will focus the study.
A. Historical Review
A preferential rate for profit derived from the sale of capital assets
was first enacted by Congress in 1921 allowing "profits earned over a
series of years"8 relief from the graduated rates applied to ordinary in-
breeding, dairy, or sporting purposes, and held by him for 24 months or more
from the date of acquisition, and
(B) other livestock, regardless of age, held by the taxpayer for draft,
breeding, dairy, or sporting purposes, and held by him for 12 months or
more from the date of acquisition. Such term does not include poultry.
(4) Unharvested Crop -- In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in
the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land
are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted) at the same
time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as "property used in
the trade or business."
0 A third provision, section 1237, offers a safe harbor whereby a taxpayer engaged in the
sale of subdivided property may attain capital gains treatment. The criteria set forth
in that section are highly restrictive and technical. Only in rare circumstances will each
of the required conditions be met. CODE, § 1237.
The statute was originally enacted to decrease the volume of litigation which arose as
a result of subdivision sales of real estate. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 84
(1954). The mechanical rules and the limitation on the number of lots which may be
sold in any one year have restricted its use. Thus, few are able to avail themselves of the
statute's benefit with the result that the litigation in this area has continued. (In the last
ten years more than fifty published cases have been reported dealing with the question of
the treatment of gain from realty transactions.) The question of whether a gain qualifies
for section 1237 treatment, however, is beyond the scope of this article. For further
discussion of this issue see Primmer, Sales of Subdivided Realty -- Capital Gains v.
Ordinary Income, 19 S.W.L.J. 116, 136 n.113 (1965).
7 Hereinafter, reference to the term capital asset will include the term property used in a
trade or business. This does not distort the issue since the two types of property have a
significant common exception -- property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course
of the taxpayer's trade or business. If an item falls into that category it cannot be either
a capital asset or property used in a trade or business of the taxpayer.
This article is confined to an examination of real estate as a capital asset. For recent
general discussions of the character of capital assets outside this ambit see International
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 588 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 157
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Charles A. Sykes, 57 T.C. 618 (1972).
8 H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12-13 (1921).
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come. Section 206(a)(6)9 of the 1921 Code excluded from the defini-
tion of the term capital asset, "stock in trade of a taxpayer or property
of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the tax-
payer if on hand at the close of the taxable year." Those items which
were properly includible as items of inventory were listed in regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, real property
not being listed. In harmony with the Commissioner, the Board of Tax
Appeals on various occasions held that the inventory exception did not
exclude land from treatment as a capital asset.10 In 1924, however, the
exception broadened "to remove any doubt as to whether property which
is held primarily for resale constitutes a capital asset, whether or not it
is the type of property which under good accounting practice would be
includible in the inventory."" Excluded now was "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or business."' 12
The emphasis was placed upon the taxpayer's intent to resell the prop-
erty instead of upon accounting practices.
In 1934 that phrase was once again modified to read: "property held
by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business."' 3 The purpose of this modification was to nullify
the contention that a stock speculator trading on his own account was
in the trade or business of selling stocks, making his stock market losses
fully deductible in the year of the sale.' 4 Accordingly, the sale must be
to a customer, in the ordinary course of business and not a mere trading
activity. The intent of the taxpayer to resell, while of continued impor-
tance, would not be determinative unless these conditions of sale to a
customer and sale within the ordinary course of business were initially
met.
By the middle of the Depression, the scenario was set. If the tax-
payer sold parcels of land at a profit, the Commissioner would assert
that the land sold by the taxpayer was property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business excluding it
from the definition of capital asset, the consequence being treatment of
the profit as ordinary income. The taxpayer would retort that the land
was a capital asset with attendant capital gains on its sale, making the
exclusion inapplicable.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 232.
10 Loughborough Dev. Corp., 29 B.T.A. 95 (1933); John Welch, 19 B.T.A. 394 (1930),
modified, 59 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1932); Albert F. Kinney, 17 B.T.A. 560 (1929); Atlantic
Coast Realty Co., 11 B.T.A. 416 (1928).
1 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924); S. RE. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22 (1924).
12 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 62.
13 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 714. (Words italicized added in 1934).
This is the exact wording of the phrase as it is presently reiterated in CODE § 1221(1) and
§ 1231(b)(1)(B). In 1942 Congress enacted § 117(j), 56 Stat. 846, ch. 619, § 151 (1942).
It was the basis for CooE § 1231. See Levin, Capital Gains or Income Tax on Real
Estate Sales, 37 B.U.L. REV. 165, 166-68 (1957) for another description of the legislative
history of § 1221 and § 1231.
14 H.R. REP. No. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934).
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II. THE INITIAL APPROACH
Fledgling case law turned on the issue of whether one was selling
real eastate "in the ordinary course of his trade or business." 15  The
other part of the exclusionary phrase dealing with the requirement that
it be held "primarily for sale to customers" was ignored. Typical in this
respect is the case of Richards v. Commissioner6 where the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed a Tax Court decision holding that a farmer's gain on the sub-
division and sale of his vegetable farm was ordinary income. The court,
in concluding that "business" was a very comprehensive term, adopted
a definition approved in a 1916 Supreme Court case - business is that
which "occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of
a livelihood or profit.' 1 7 On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the court
held that the taxpayer engaged in the business of selling real estate with-
in the broad definition that had been set by the Supreme Court.' 8 It
was found most significant that improvements to the farm in promotion
of the subdivision plan were financed by a bank. The argument that
the subdivision and sale was a liquidation of a capital asset was, there-
fore, unpersuasive.
A. The "Tests" Approach
As the litigation in this area began to multiply, the courts considered
a number of different factors and developed "tests" whereby it could
be objectively determined whether the taxpayer was in the business of
selling real estate. Frequency of sales and continuity of involvement were
the premier factors.' 9 One of the more ingenious "tests" to emerge was
the "busyness" test devised by Circuit Judge Sibley in Snell v. Commis-
sioner.20  While examining the phrase "in the ordinary course of his
trade or business" the Judge focused on the word "business."
The word, notwithstanding disguise in spelling and pro-
nunciation, means busyness; it implies that one is kept more
or less busy; that the activity is an occupation. It need not be
one's sole occupation, nor take all his time. It may be only
seasonal, and not active the year round. It ordinarily is implied
that one's own attention and effort are involved, but the maxim
qui facit per alium facit per se applies, and one may carry on a
business through agents whom he supervises.
2
'
15 Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941);
Welch v. Solomon, 99 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1938); Wineman Realty Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 424 (1943).
16 81 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1936).
17 id. at 372, quoting VonBaunbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S. 503, 515 (1916).
18 Id. at 374.
19 Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Boeing, 106
F.2d 305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939); Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d
891 (5th Cir. 1938).
20 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
21 Id. at 892-93.
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By the late nineteen-forties, the courts had utilized numerous well
recognized tests in deciding the many cases presenting this question. 22
Among the tests were continuity of sales or sales related activity over a
period of time; frequency of sales, as opposed to isolated transactions;
the activity of the seller or those acting under his instructions; the ex-
tent or substantiality of the transactions; and the reasons, purpose, or
nature of the acquisition of the subject matter.
The listing of the above tests culled from other cases and the colla-
tion of the facts with those tests was the methodology first employed in
Boomhower v. United States.2 3  Boomhower, a lawyer, had purchased
farm land, which had not been a profitable investment, from a trust for
which he was trustee. In later years as the town of Mason City, Iowa
began to expand, the lawyer was approached by a lumber company that
had a plan to subdivide. the property supplying its products to builders
who would construct homes on it. A city ordinance required that the
land be platted before it could be sold. The lawyer complied with this
requirement before sale and also improved the property for home
sites. A portion of the subdivision was sold through the lumber com-
pany. The court found that the taxpayer did not hold the land primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his business. The asset
was acquired to save the trust from suffering further loss. "The extent
of the taxpayer's activities with or concerning the subject matter"24
was found to be minimal, the court believing this to be the most impor-
tant test. Additionally, the activities of the lumber company could not be
attributed to him. Although improvements were extensive, they were
necessary to make the capital asset saleable. The property had been
held for five years before resale during which Boomhower's other real
estate activities lacked continuity. Richards25 was distinguished on
the basis that the management activities of the taxpayer and his agents,
that is, the bank that financed Richards, supplied "the continuity requi-
site for a business."26
The greatest difficulty with the Boomhower approach was that it re-
quired a voluminous factual record often bringing in the extraneous and
the trivial.27  The courts most often characterized the issues as being
entirely factual to be examined in the light of all surrounding circum-
stances. 28  Each test was said to hold no greater weight than any other.29
22 W.T. Thrift, 15 T.C. 366, 369 (1950).
23 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
24 Id. at 1004.
25 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
26 74 F. Supp. at 1003.
27 For examples of this approach (independently aligning facts to tests) and some variations
see Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d
931 (4th Cir. 1955); Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Sylvester A. Lowery, 33
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 169 (1964); Eline Realty Co., 35 T.C. 1 (1960); James G. Hoover, 32
T.C. 618 (1959); W. Linton Atkinson, 31 T.C. 1241 (1959); Charles E. Reithmeyer, 26
T.C. 804 (1956); Carl E. Metz, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 976 (1955); Thomas E. Wood, 16
T.C. 213 (1951); W.T. Thrift, 15 T.C. 366 (1950).
Is E.g., Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Browne v. United States,
356 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Ralph J. Oace, 39 T.C. 743 (1963).
(Vol. 24:573
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Distillation of any guidelines from these cases which would allow one to
reasonably predict the status of his profit on a real property sale became
impossible,3 resulting in increased litigation.3 1  Congress attempted to
reduce the uncertainty by enacting Section 1237 as part of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,32 but this addition did little to relieve the pres-
sure. Some courts found the analysis so burdensome that they resorted
to purely ad hoc determinations.
33
While most courts believed that the Boomhower approach was the axe
to cleave the Gordian knot of defining the term capital asset when con-
fronted with a real estate fact situation, a fresh look was taken in Mu-
nicipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner.34
B. Increased Focus on Statutory Language
Charles F. Curry was a successful Kansas City developer who built,
owned, and sold apartment buildings while also advising others on real
estate dealings. To house his varied investments he formed nine corpo-
rations including Municipal Bond Corporation of which he was president,
director and controlling shareholder. Between 1954 and 1958 Municipal
Bond sold nineteen tracts of land from which the profits amounted to
more than $120,000. The properties, mostly vacant lots, had been held
an average of four and one-half years. The corporation's other source of
income was a lease with a railroad. The Commissioner determined that
the gains on the nineteen sales were ordinary income and assessed a
deficiency in excess of $38,000.00. The Tax Court decided that the
Commissioner did not err in his determination. Despite initial reference
to the tests approach, the court focused on the word "primarily" which it
interpreted to mean substantial.35
29 E.g., Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Austin v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1953); Wellesby A. Ayling, 32 T.C. 704 (1959); Julian E.
Ross, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 905 (1954); Reuben Eckstrom, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 213
(1953); Adam Schantz, Sr. Corp., 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 373 (1952).
30 See Cole v. Usry, 294 F.2d 426, 427 n.3 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Surrey, Definitional
Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 985, 991 (1956) and Weithorn,
supra note 3, at 160.
31 The Tax Court observed that this question appeared to be one of the most frequently
litigated issues under the Internal Revenue Code. Charles E. Reithmeyer, 26 T.C. 804,
806 (1956).
32 See note 6, supra.
33 Finding ourselves engulfed in a fog of decisions with gossamer like distinctions,
and a quagmire of unworkable, unreliable, and often irrelevant tests, we take the
route of ad hoc exploration ....
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Chandler v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Viggo Gruy, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 196
(1950); Benjamin C. Norton, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 335 (1946).
When the Fifth Circuit was once again required to meet the question, Judge Brown
depicted the issue as "the old, familiar, recurring, vexing and oft-times elusive prob-
lem .... ." Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1963).
34 41 T.C. 20 (1963).
31 Id. at 28, citing, inter alia, Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th
Cir. 1951).
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This construction permits recognition of the dual purpose con-
cept inherent in some types of business operations. In petition-
er's real estate operations, its dual purpose is obvious. Peti-
tioner acquired and held real estate for the dual purpose of both
investment and sale to the public. And while the sales purpose,
in some instances, may not have been predominant over the in-
vestment purpose, it was, nevertheless, substantial throughout
the entire period under review. Petitioner's gains from the
sale of properties in some years exceeded its gains from all
other sources. They were substantial in each of the years in-
volved. On an overall basis the gains from real estate sales
and from rentals, petitioner's two principal sources of income,
were about equal. 36
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 37 concluding
that the word "primarily" had a plain and usual meaning:
The word "primarily" is unambiguous and has a well-recog-
nized and understood meaning. It has been construed in vari-
ous types of cases of federal and state courts as meaning "of
first importance or principally.
'
"
3 8
The court went on to criticize the Tax Court for failing to make a
determination on a tract-by-tract basis. As a final point, it observed
that Municipal Bond Corporation was a distinct and separate entity. Con-
sequently, the operations of the other corporations "would have no pro-
bative force in establishing the taxpayer's purpose of holding real estate
except to the extent that it might be shown that the other corporations
were acting as [agents] for the taxpayer." 3 9 On remand the Tax Court
found that six of the nineteen sales were of capital assets.40
The Tax Court had relied upon Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner4
for the proposition that "primarily" meant "essential" or "substantial."
Rollingwood Corporation had been formed for the specific purpose of
building low-rent housing for workers brought to the Richmond, Virginia
area during World War II, providing each occupant with a rent-option
agreement. Seven hundred houses were built and disposed of pursuant
to such agreements. The Ninth Circuit unequivocally accepted the Com-
missioner's definition of primarily, reasoning that if a person held prop-
erty with the dual intentions of rental (if the rental market were good)
and sale (if the sales market were more profitable), one of the essential
purposes for holding the property was sale.42  (It may have been an as-
31 Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 29 (1963) (emphasis added).
31 Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965).
31 Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
11 Id. at 691.
40 Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219 (1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 F.2d 184 (8th
Cir. 1967). For discussion of the second opinion of the Eighth Circuit see text accompa-
nying notes 161-69 infra.
41 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
12 The court determined that the legislative purpose of INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(j)
was to treat proceeds of a sale of an asset held by a taxpayer with these motivations as
[Vol. 24:573
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sumption, considering the extensive activities of the taxpayer, but the
court never made an explicit finding that these homes were sold in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's "trade or business.")
The Municipal Bond decision created a classic split in circuits,
43
making necessary Supreme Court resolution of the conflict.
III. MALAT v. RIDDELL
44
Malat is the only comment which the Supreme Court has ever made
on the subject of the classification of real property as a capital or non-
capital asset. Although there have been a great number of cases con-
struing the capital gains provisions contained in Subchapter P of the In-
ternal Revenue Code,45 only Malat arose from a dispute involving real
property.
William Malat was a general partner in Louis Lesser Enterprises, Ltd.
which formed a joint venture in the summer of 1953 with four indviduals,
acquiring acreage in Inglewood, California. According to the district
court's findings, the members of the joint venture "as of the date the
44.901 acres were acquired, intended either to sell the property or de-
velop it for rental, depending upon which course appeared to be most
profitable. '" 4
The interior of the tract was subdivided into 105 lots, distributed to
the joint venturers as equal tenants in common, and ultimately trans-
ferred to a second joint venture. Gain from the sale of this subdivided
tract was reported as ordinary income. As to the remaining property
which fronted on intersecting boulevards, a rift arose among the joint
venturers which resulted in acrimony making continued business rela-
tions as partners unpleasant. 47  Consequently, nine acres were sold to
ordinary income. This section is substantially similar to CODE § 1231. See note 13
supra.
The capital gains provisions are remedial provisions. Congress intended to
alleviate the burden on a taxpayer whose property has increased in value over a
long period of time from having the profits from sales taxed at graduated tax
rates designed for a single year's income. The purpose is to protect "investment
property" as distinguished from "stock in trade," or property bought and sold
for profit. It is our view that this policy was not meant to apply to a situation
where one of the essential purposes in holding the property is sale.
Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1951) (footnotes
omitted).
43 The word "primarily" as used in CODE § 1231 and INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 117(j) had
been construed with varied results by other circuits in settings not involving real estate.
See Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460 (Ct. Cl. 1964); American Can Co. v.
Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th
Cir. 1951).
44 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (per curiam).
4- See, e.g., Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Corn Product
Refining Company had speculated in commodity futures and declared its profits to be
capital gains. The Supreme Court held that such hedging transactions were excluded
from treatment as capital gains. The case is most often cited for the proposition that the
capital gains provisions are "relief provisions" which "must be narrowly applied and its
exclusions interpreted broadly." Id. at 52. See also Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,
356 U.S. 260 (1958).
41 Malat v. Riddell, Civil No. 69-169-EC (S.D. Cal. April 21, 1964) (Finding of Fact #18).
47 Id.
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one faction of the joint venture and slightly less than eleven acres were
conveyed to an unrelated real estate developer. These last two sales
were reported as sales of capital assets by the joint venture with Louis
Lesser Enterprises, Ltd. and its general partner, Malat, in turn treating
their portion of the profit as a capital gain. Malat was assessed a defi-
ciency on the classification of the profits of the two sales as capital gain.
Malat paid the deficiency and filed his complaint for a refund in the
district court for Southern California.
Judge E. Avery Crary rendered the opinion of the district court find-
ing that the members of the joint venture held the property for the dual
purposes of either selling or developing it depending upon which was
more profitable. The judge considered Rollingwood to be most applica-
ble, stating:
Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the subject real properties were not held by Plaza
[the joint venture] primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of trade or business. Rollingwood Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F. 2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
The subject real property was held for development or sale,
depending upon which course appeared to be most profitable.
Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. Any rift among the
partners may have expedited the sale but did not affect any es-
sential primary purpose for which the property was held. 48
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explored the nether
reaches of the joint venturers' minds to determine their purposes for hold-
ing the property. 4 The court said first that "an investor's prospective
recognition of the fact that he may ultimately wish to realize a profit on
his investment is not enough to constitute sale [as being one of the] dual
purpose[s]" for holding the property. 50 At the time they purchased the
property, the joint venturers were aware of many possibilities for gain.
The avenues included sale, commercial development, or subdivision.
Each plan was explored; when one plan (commercial development) be-
came impossible because of the inimical relationship between the part-
ners, they pursued an alternate course (sale).51
Before the Supreme Court,52 the government's position was that a tax-
payer who purchases an asset for either rental or sale in the ordinary
48 Malat v. Riddell, Civil No. 69-169-EC (S.D. Cal. April 21, 1964) (Conclusions of Law
#3, #4). The "Memorandum Opinion for Use in Preparing Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment" written by Judge Crary also relied heavily on
Rollingwood quoting the opinion at length. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
19 Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965).
50 Id. at 26.
51 Sale, then, was not the liquidation of an investment. It was the final alternative
in taxpayer's continuing efforts to realize gain from his acquisition. It was part
of his plan rather than the abandonment of it.
Id. at 27 (first emphasis added).
52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and dealt with the case in a per curiam opinion
concurred in by seven Justices. Justice White took no part in the opinion; Justice Black
would have affirmed the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
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course of his business, whichever is more profitable, is not entitled to have
his regular business profits from such sale taxed as capital gains.
This proposition would have covered most "dual purpose" holding situa-
tions. It was argued that this general proposition did not depend upon
an examination of the word "primarily" as contained in the exception
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business." Rather, the government
claimed, the definition of a capital asset must first be read narrowly.
54
In this instance, the property held for the dual purpose was not initially
a capital asset, creating no need to even consider the exceptions. Since
the word "primarily" is contained in the exception, not the definition,
it was not necessary to examine it.
The government brief went on to explain an alternate ground for the
result: the exception should be read broadly, and "primarily" should be
interpreted to mean "substantial." The major argument of the taxpayer's
brief, in contrast, was simply that "primarily" does not mean "substan-
tial." 55
The Supreme Court looked to the narrow issue as presented by
Malat, engaging in none of the psychology of the court of appeals.
Choosing restraint in its approach, the Court's opinion solely addressed
the construction of the word "primarily" as used in section 1221(1) of
the Code. It observed that words in statutes should be interpreted where
possible in their ordinary everyday sense. 56  The ordinary everyday
meaning of the word "primarily" was held to be "of first importance" or
"principally. 57  This interpretation, it was thought, did not do violence
to the legislative purpose of the capital gains provisions which sought to
differentiate between "the profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of a business" and "the realization of appreciation in value ac-
crued over a substantial period of time."5 8  Since an incorrect legal
standard had been applied by interpreting "primarily" to mean "sub-
stantial," the case was vacated; upon remand it was found that the pur-
pose of first importance to the members of the joint venture was to
hold the property for development or rental. It was concluded as a
matter of law that the taxpayer had established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the real properties sold were not held by the joint ven-
5 Brief for Respondent at 12-17, Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
51 Id. at 17.
5 Brief for Petitioner at 12-17, Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
56 Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966). It is significant that the Supreme Court
ignored the Government's contention that the definition of capital asset is something
apart from the exceptions contained in the sections 1221 and 1231. It is not a principal
of law that a taxpayer has two burdens -- first, proof that the property in question is a
capital asset and second, proof that it is not covered by one of the exceptions.
57 Id. at 572.
Id. In light of this statement the holding period in Malat should be noted. The joint
venture opened an escrow account for purchase of the Century and Crenshaw Boulevards
property on August 12, 1953 and closed the sale February 15, 1954. The two sales of the
property which were the subject of the suit occurred October 15, 1954 (eight months
later), and November 5, 1954 (less than nine months later). Query: should it not be
inferred that eight months is a "substantial period of time"?
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ture primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or
business. 59
Since Malat was the first expression by the Supreme Court on this
specific issue, the lower courts were forced to reexamine their approaches
to the subject. Importantly, the opinion did not mention the tests which
had become a crutch for a majority of courts. The opinion looked di-
rectly to the statutory phrase and focused on a single word within it.
Malat did not halt the flood of litigation but it did channel the flood-
waters.
60
IV. THE POST-MALAT PULSE
Although Malat appeared to have resolved much of the controversy
in the area, a number of questions still merited examination. The courts
were left with the problem of how to apply the dictates of the decision.
Procedural questions remained unanswered as well as the question of
what position, if any, the tests formulae (or at least their underlying
principles) were to occupy in the new order.
A. Procedural and Preliminary Features
Although Malat was a blow for the taxpayer against the government
it has not meant the wholesale classification of real property as a capital
asset. There remain concrete obstacles to proving the subject of a realty
sale to be a capital asset, many of which are procedural. First, the de-
terminations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are prima facie
correct. Once he has determined that the proceeds from a particular
realty sale are ordinary income, the burden of proof shifts to the tax-
payer.6 1 Thus, in what is mainly a contest of marshalling facts, the tax-
payer must be the active force in assembling them in order to meet this
presumption with a preponderance of evidence.
The question of whether those findings must be made as to each sepa-
rate parcel sold or merely as to the taxpayer's dealings as a whole pre-
sents another procedural problem. Previously when the issue was mere-
ly whether the taxpayer was selling real estate in the ordinary course of
his business, it was unimportant to examine each individual piece of prop-
erty. Important were the overall real estate activities of the taxpayer.
Since Malat, however, a determination must be made as to whether the
taxpayer held any particular tract primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his business. 62 Thus, some land may be held primar-
5 Malat v. Riddell, 275 F. Supp. 358, 361 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
0 See Albert W. Turner, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1088, 1104 (1974).
61 See, e.g., Estate of Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1968); Municipal
Bond Corp. v. United States, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967); Myers v. United States, 345
F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1973); S.O.
Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966); Thomas A. Cary, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 881 (1973); Ridgewood
Land Co., 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1973).
62 Malat involved two separate sales, yet there were no separate findings as to each of the
two sales. This may be explained in that the sales were of contiguous property within
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ily for sale to customers while other acreage may not. The Municipal
Bond case which correctly forecast the position of the Supreme Court
as to the definition of the word "primarily" stated that purpose or inten-
tion must be determined for each individual tract since the purpose of
holding property may vary.6
Despite this, some courts have failed to make separate findings,64
claiming that it would serve no useful purpose.6 5 Since the issue of
classifying real property as a capital or non-capital asset has been con-
tinuously viewed as basically a factual issue,6" it is difficult to understand
why no useful purpose would be served by such a detailed analysis.
The preferrable procedure is to make a finding on a tract-by-tract basis
and if necessary, a sale-by-sale basis unless, of course, the circumstances
surrounding the sales are so similar as to make the analyses redundant.
The subdivision of a tract, for example, would not require a separate con-
clusion as to each and every sublot sold.
67
The conclusions of the finder of fact are especially important in
these types of cases since the scope of review on appeal is limited. The
underlying issue being basically one of fact,6 8 certain courts of appeals
have limited their review solely to the question of whether the trial
court was clearly erroneous in reaching its result.69 It is reasoned that
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demands this limita-
tion.7 0
This position is not without dissenters; the Third and Fifth Circuits
allow a more liberal scope of review.71  These circuits argue that the
one month of each other and were for the same reason -- to end a joint venture which had
gone awry. Separate findings for such similar fact patterns would have been repetitive.
- 341 F.2d 683, 689 (1965).
04 See, e.g., Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
824 (1968); Peter R. Shibley, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 623 (1971); John P. Vidican, 38 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1191 (1969).
:1 John P. Vidican, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1191 (1969).
66 See text accompanying note 68 infra.
61 This approach was approved by the Eighth Circuit in Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915,
921 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 824 (1968); Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266
(Ct. Cl. 1966). For examples of tract-by-tract analysis see Cairo Developers, Inc. v.
United States, 381 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ga. 1974); Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219
(1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967); Albert W. Turner, 43
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1088, 1105 (1974); Harbour Properties, Inc., 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
562, 606 (1973).
6 See, e.g., Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972); Huxford v. United States, 441
F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner
v. Tri-S Corp., 400 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1968); Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
See Brown v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1971); Estate of Freeland v. Commis-
sioner, 393 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1968); Joan E. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir. 1967); Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967).
70 Fm. R. Civ. P. 52(a). That Rule states that findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the ciedibility of the witnesses." (Emphasis added.)
71 See Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1103 (1973);
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969); see also Baum v. United States, 409
F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1969), where the lower court's jury verdict was affirmed because a review
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finder of fact concludes as to an ultimate fact, that is, whether the prop-
erty was held by the taxpayer primarily for sale in the ordinary course
of his trade or business. Ultimate facts are not subject to the "clearly
erroneous" limitation since they call for reasoning and interpretation
more akin to conclusions of law than findings of fact. Malat is silent on
this particular aspect. The Supreme Court's reversal in that case was
due to "the courts below applying an incorrect legal standard. '7 2  It
might be implied from that statement that the Justices recognized the
"clearly erroneous" doctrine as the appropriate scope of review for a
court of appeals. This is, at best, merely an inference and not the hold-
ing of the Court. As a result of this inconclusive language in addition
to the different views among the circuits, this procedural issue remains
unresolved.
Another hurdle confronting the taxpayer concerns the holding in
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner73 that the capital gains
provisions must be construed narrowly since they are relief provisions. 74
This is a mandate to broadly interpret the exclusions from the defini-
tion of capital asset thereby narrowly interpreting the definition. The
Malat Court, however, made clear that a broad construction may be given
to the exclusions only to the extent it does not do violence to the plain
language of the statute. A court should not be so overzealous in pursuing
a broad interpretation of the exclusion as to give the phrase a meaning
contrary to the intent of Congress.
B. The New Approach: Analysis of the Statutory Language
Malat v. Riddell returned the attention of the courts to the language
of sections 1221(1) and 1231(b)(1)(B). 75  The reexamination of the
statutory language in Malat led to a new pattern of close dissection of
the exclusionary phrase "held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business."
In the first case concerning the treatment of profits from the sale of
real property to be reviewed by the Tax Court after Malat,76 judge
Tannenwald, in a concurring opinion, advocated this approach. The facts
of the record revealed "ample and substantial evidence" to support it. The Seventh Circuit
remains uncommitted. See Hansche v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1972).
1 383 U.S. at 572.
73 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
14 Id.; see note 45 supra. This proposition has been cited in a number of cases involving reality
sales. See Hansche v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972); Cairo Developers, Inc.
v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 431,440 (M.D. Ga. 1974); S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 298 (1966);
Climate Control, Inc., 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 852, 856 (1974); Estate of Sam E. Broadhead,
41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993, 1108 (1972); Ridgewood Land Co., 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40, 45
(1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1973).
7 Yet even prior to the decision there was a warning:
Essential as they are in the adjudication of cases, we must take guard lest we be
so carried away by the proliferation of tests that we forget that the statute excludes
from capital assets "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business."
Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1963).
76 S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 301 (1966).
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of the case involved a husband and wife who were engaged in the land-
scaping business on a farm of 113 acres. The business did not prosper
and they were forced to procure loans from a bank. Late in 1959, it was
decided that subdivision of their farm would be financially beneficial.
An arrangement with a bank to which they were indebted was negotiated
allowing a partial release of the mortgage on the property securing their
loans. The subdivision was advertised and listed with local realtors and
by September of 1960, thirty-eight lots had been subdivided and sold.
Unconvinced by petitioners' argument that they were trying to sell just
enough land to satisfy the debt to the bank, the Tax Court found the
proceeds to be ordinary income. The majority gave faint recognition to
the holding of Malat by commenting that "this purpose [holding the
property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or busi-
ness] had become of first importance'77 as evidenced by the extensive
improvement activities made by the taxpayers.
Except for this comment, the Tax Court's opinion was a mere amalga-
mation of undistinguished authorities, lacking analysis. Judge Tannen-
wald's concurrence admonished that since this was the first case after
Malat it was "extremely important [that the basis of the decision] be
crystal clear. . . . Otherwise we will simply provide more fuel for the
fires of further litigation in this area. 
' 78
Judge Tannenwald continued by breaking the exclusionary phrase
into three elements:
1. "Primarily" which, as the Supreme Court has mandated,
means of "first importance." The element of substantiality is no
longer enough. By the same token, the proscribed purpose does
not, I believe, have to be capable of a quantitative measurement
of more than 50 percent. It should be sufficient if such purpose
is primus inter pares.
2. "For sale to customers." This is the least significant
element. Unquestionably, any person who proposes to sell his
property has "for sale" as his purpose. Equally clearly, anyone
who buys the property is a "customer."
3. "In the ordinary course of business." This phrase is cru-
cial. Thus, the taxpayer must be in a business of which the sale
is a part. In addition, even though a sale is usually the "ordi-
nary" way of disposing of property, it must also be in the "ordi-
nary course" of the business. Thus, a decision by a manufac-
turer to sell an outmoded plant would not be within the
proscribed purpose.79
This approach was applied by certain other courts. The first two
elements were usually united by making a finding whether the taxpayer
held the property at the time of sale "primarily for sale to customers."
Then, if established, an additional finding would be made to decide if
11 Id. (emphasis added).
78 Id. (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 302.
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the sale was made "in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or
business." 0 The tests were most often relegated to a lesser status, with
the observation that they "in and of themselves . ..have no indepen-
dent significance, but only form part of a situation which in the individual
case must be considered in its entirety ... "'
1. Primarily for Sale to Customers
In accordance with this analytical approach, a textual examination of
sections 1221(1) and 1231(b)(1)(B) is illuminating. The first element
of the exclusionary phrase - primarily for sale to customers - was scruti-
nized in part by the Supreme Court in Malat. It has now become settled
that "primarily" means of first importance or principally. This defini-
ition has had a significant impact on lower court decisions."2
The remainder of this element - for sale to customers - has not been
the subject of much comment. Judge Tannenwald called it the least im-
portant part of the exclusion since there was obviously at least one sale
on which the treatment of the profits would be in dispute, and a sale is
by definition to a customer.m This is not necessarily true, however,
since the word "customer" was inserted for the purpose of denying stock
market investors the advantage of declaring market losses to be ordinary
losses by claiming that they were in the trade or business of speculating
in stocks. Stock market investors selling through brokers did not sell
to customers.8 4  Although most courts fail to give the word "customer"
any consideration, 5 Judge Nichols' dissent in Goodman v. United States
presents this forceful logic:
The majority considers the meaning of the word "primarily",
but they pass the word "customers" over in silence. I presume
some sales are other than to customers, else the word is surplus-
age. In my semantics, the word fits the buyers of subdivision
lots perfectly and the purchasers here involved not at all. How-
ever, we may assume arguendo that if a person is in a "trade or
business" the persons lie sells- to in the ordinary course of his
business are "customers".8 6
80 For examples of this method see United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969);
Beidenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976); William B. Dean, 43 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 969 (1974); Robert E. Ronhovde, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1373 (1967).
1' United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969), quoting Cole v. Usry, 294 F.2d
426,427 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Cairo Developers, Inc. v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 431,440
(M.D. Ga. 1974); Beidenharn Realty Co. v. Urtited States, 356 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (W.D.
La. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
82 See, e.g., Malat v. Riddell, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 86, 800 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (applying this stan-
dard upon remand from Supreme Court, both realty sales found to be capital assets); Munici-
pal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219 (1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967)
(found 11 of 19 sales to yield capital gains).
83 S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 302 (1966).
8 See text accompanying notes 13, 14 supra.
8 See, e.g., William I. Nash, 60 T.C. 503, 515 (1973), acquiesced in, 1974-3 Cu.". BULL.
-; George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120, 127 (1966).
86 390 F.2d 915, 925 (Ct. Cl.) (Nichols, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 824 (1968).
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The word "customer" needs greater consideration and cannot be treated
as mere excess. It connotes something other than a buyer.8 7  A class
of people who frequent an establishment for the purpose of purchasing
what is being offered for sale would be a reasonable description. A
shopper at a grocery store is a customer, but a syndicate purchasing a
multimillion dollar corporation directly from its shareholders is not a cus-
tomer within the plain meaning of the word (and in Judge Nichols'
eyes, probably not buying in the ordinary course). These are undoubtedly
the ends of the spectrum.
2. In the Ordinary Course of Trade or Business
This element has been the subject of varied interpretations. The
threshold question is: What is a "trade or business"? In response, some
courts have returned to the "busyness" test devised in Snell.8  In
Robert L. Adam89 the taxpayer sold twelve unimproved waterfront lots
over a three year period. He was a certified public accountant earn-
ing almost $100,000.00 annually as a managing partner in a large firm.
His profits from the real estate sales for the three years at issue totaled
more than $75,000.00. The Tax Court categorized the profits as capital
gains. The taxpayer was not in the trade or business of selling unim-
proved land because he did not meet the "busyness" test of Snell. His
activities were infrequent and he performed no service which enhanced
the value of the properties. The court further relied upon Boomhower,90
in that there was no continuity or sustained activity in the real estate
field; the majority of his time was spent as an accountant. In contrast,
an individual who improved and platted certain property and sold the
subdivided lots informally from his home without advertising showed
"the singleness of purpose" which characterizes a trade or business.9 1
[T]he taxpayer here devoted a substantial amount of his time,
skill and financial resources to developing and selling the prop-
erty. He thereby became engaged in the business of subdivid-
ing real estate for sale. One need not be a static holder to qual-
ify for capital gains treatment, but the flexing of commercial
muscles with frequency and continuity, design and effect does
result in disqualification because it indicates one has entered
the business of real estate sales.92
In addition to "busyness," the relative amounts of real estate income as
compared to one's occupational income may demonstrate that one is in
the trade or business of selling real estate.9 3 Hence, one is in the trade
87 The key to the definition seems to be regularity. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY
DIcTIONARY 450 (2d ed. 1970).
s See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
89 60 T.C. 996 (1973).
'0 See text accompanying notes 23, 24 supra.
91 United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 912 (5th Cir. 1969).
92 Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
93 It has been noted that when more than one-half of the taxpayer's income is from realty sales,
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or business of selling realty if he does it frequently, with some degree
of continuity, devoting a substantial amount of his time and effort to
the activity, while making expenditures in furtherance of it and deriving a
good portion of his income therefrom.
Using these factors as the means to define "trade or business" forces
some speculation. First, can one be in the trade or business of selling
capital assets and receive capital gains treatment on the income de-
rived therefrom? If this is the sole activity of a taxpayer does that taint
whatever opportunity he may have to reap capital gains from the sales?
Although there is some contrary authority,9 4 there exists the cautionary
note that such activity must not be continuous.
95
Another uncertainty is whether one can be in multiple trades or
businesses if to be in a trade or business requires singleness of purpose.
The Snell case stated that a trade or business "need not be one's sole
occupation, nor take all his time."9 6  If, however, one has a regular
occupation it may tend to show that the realty sales were merely a
sideline.97 Of course, when one's regular business is adjunct to realty
sales there should be no such inference. The rental of apartment build-
ings, for example, merely for the purpose of establishing their value so
that they might command a higher sale price did not prevent the tax-
payer from being in the business of selling those various buildings9 8
Lastly, it is open to question whether an admitted real estate dealer
may set aside certain property for investment purposes in a fashion simi-
lar to a stockbroker who establishes a personal investment account.
The definition of "trade or business" may seem on the surface to preclude
such a segregation but, as shall be later explained more fully, such segre-
gation might be possible.99
If the threshold question of being in the trade or business of selling
realty is answered affirmatively, the exclusionary phrase requires the
additional element that the sale be in the ordinary course of that busi-
ness. This intimates a "concept of normalcy" in the sales. 00  Thus,
there is an indication of the existence of a realty sales business. John P. Vidican, 38 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1191 (1969).
94 There is nothing unique or improper about a corporation engaging in exclusive-
ly investment activity. We can find no basis in the Code, the regulations there-
under, the decided cases, or the general [sic] accepted concepts of tax law for
requiring that every corporation must have some "ordinary income" activity.
William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546, 553 (1972), acquiesced in, 1974-8 CuM. BuLL. 7.
5 Id. at 554, citing 512 W. Fifty-sixth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir.
1945).
96 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938),
97 A taxpayer was not in the trade or business of selling real estate when he was in the busi-
ness of constructing homes. Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278 (1970). A taxpayer whose
principal business was outdoor advertising and the management of numerous investments was
held not to be engaged in the business of selling real estate. C. Frederick Frick, 41 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 301 (1972). Apartment houses held for rent were not part of a subsequent real
estate sales business. Peter R. Shibley, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1971).
98 William I. Nash, 60 T.C. 503 (1973), acquiesced in, 1974-3 Cum. BuLL. 5.
99 See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
100 United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 912 (5th Cir. 1969); Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C.
1278, 1286 (1970).
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when a company whose income, derived from stocks, bonds, farming
operations, rentals, and royalties, sold subdivided lots through inde-
pendent contractors, the company neither advertising nor controlling
the independent contractors, any sublots sold were not classified as
sold in the ordinary course of the company's trade or business. 10 1 Simi-
larly, if one is forced to abandon a disappointing investment by means
of a series of sales, it is not in the ordinary course of his business.102
Liquidations, however, may eventually become so extensive that the tax-
payer enters into a new trade or business with sales thereafter being in its
ordinary course.
0 3
Accordingly, proper analysis of the exclusionary phrase contained in
section 1221(1) and 1231(b)(1)(B) requires close examination of each
word. For the exclusionary phrase to apply, the land must be held pri-
marily for sale to customers and the eventual sale for profit must be in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's realty sales business.
V. THE "TEsis" FoRMuLA SuRvIvEs
Cases which utilize a textual analysis of the exclusionary phrase
represent the minority. The majority of post-Malat decisions continue
to follow a variation of the Boomhower tests. 04 Their popularity re-
mains despite the criticism which can rightfully be leveled against their
use. 10 5 The tests bring in extraneous and marginally probative facts,
101 Biedenham Realty Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1331 (1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
102 Joan E. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Kirby Lumber
Corp. v. Phinney, 412 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer in trade or business of selling pine
timber received capital gains treatment on profit derived from liquidation of its hardwood
holdings). But compare International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157
(1st Cir. 1974).
103 Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971) (court of appeals affirmed jury ver-
dict finding a taxpayer who had sold off his timber holdings which had once been used for
the production of turpentines, but which had been rendered obsolete by synthetics, was in a
new trade or business of timber selling thus requiring treatment of the profits as ordinary in-
come).
104 See, e.g., Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1103 (1973);
Hansche v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Phinney,
412 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1968); Segel
v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966); Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States,
CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (75-1, at 86,935) 9386 (D.N.J.
Mar. 20, 1975); William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546 (1972), acquiesced in, 1974-8 CUM.
BULL. 7; Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278 (1970); Harbour Properties, Inc., 48 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 562 (1973).
10s United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 1969); Thompson v. Commissioner,
322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Cole v. Usry, 294 F.2d 426,427 (5th Cir. 1961); Biedenham Realty
Co., 356 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526
F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976). See also S. 0. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 299 (1966) where the
Tax Court (without noticing the implication of its statement) stated:
Without any notable exceptions the many, many cases in this particular field
have noted that each individual case must be considered and evaluated on its
peculiar and particular facts, e.g., Kelley v. Commissioner, supra; Pool v. Com-
inissioner, supra; Lazarus v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 421 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
As stated in Lazarus, "Perhaps the only guiding principle of general application
that can be gleaned from the judicial decisions dealing with the problem .. .
is that every case of the type mentioned must be decided on the basis of its own
1975]
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becoming a quest in and of themselves so that the congressional intent
of the Code sections is lost. They are often applied mechanically but
are unreliable since an integral axiom of the tests requires that in apply-
ing them they be given differing weights in each factual setting. The
use of these tests have left this branch of income tax law to ad hoc
decision-making thwarting any effort to engage in tax planning.
Nonetheless the tests remain precedent and must be reckoned with
in order to fully consider the issues in a controversy involving the clas-
sification of real property as a capital asset. The tests are usually
broken down into six, seven, eight, or nine categories, 10 6 accompanied
by a caveat that no single test is conclusive in and of itself, and each
may be given varying weight.107 Lastly, some opinions explain that the
tests must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. 18
The tests may be grouped into three broad categories: those concern-
ing the intent of the taxpayer during the period he held the land; those
concerning the activities of the taxpayer in the realty business; and those
concerning the circumstances surrounding the purchase and sale of the
land in question.
facts, there being no single test that can be applied to all such cases with
decisive results." For this reason we have endeavored to make our findings of
fact in the instant case full and comprehensive. (Emphasis added.)
See also authorities listed at notes 30, 31 supra.
106 The six "tests" are: (1) the purpose for which the asset was acquired; (2) the frequency,
continuity, and size of the sales; (3) the activities of the seller in the improvement and disposi-
tion of the property; (4) the extent of improvements made to the property; (5) the proximity
of sale to purchase; and (6) the purpose for which the property was held during the taxable
years. William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546, 554 (1972). This approach is most popular.
The seven "tests" are: (1) the nature and purpose of the acquisition of the property and
the duration of the ownership; (2) the extent and nature of the taxpayer's efforts to sell the
property; (3) the number, extent, continuity, and substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of
subdividing, developing, and advertising to increase sales; (5) the use of a business office for
the sale of the property; (6) the character and degree of supervision or control exercised by
the taxpayer over any representative selling the property; and (7) the time and effort the tax-
payer habitually devoted to the sales. United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905,910 (5th Cir.
1969).
The eight "tests" are: (1) the purpose for which the property was acquired; (2) the pur-
pose for which it was held; (3) improvements, and their extent, made to the property by tax-
payer; (4) frequency, number, and continuity of sales; (5) the extent and substantiality of the
transactions; (6) the nature and extent of taxpayer's business; (7) the extent of advertising to
promote sales, or the lack of such advertising; and (8) listing of the property for sale directly
or through brokers. Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, CCH 1975 STAND. FED.
TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (75-1, at 86,935) 9386 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 1975).
The nine "tests" are: (1) the purpose for which the property was initially acquired; (2)
the purpose for which the property was subsequently held; (3) the extent to which improve-
ments, if any, were made to the property by the taxpayer; (4) the frequency, number, and
continuity of sales; (5) the extent and nature of the transactions involved; (6) the ordinary
business of the taxpayer; (7) the extent of advertising, promotion, or other active ef-
forts used in soliciting buyers for the sale of the property; (8) the listing of property with
brokers; and (9) the purpose for which the property was held at the time of sale. Maddux
Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278, 1284 (1970).
107 Koch v. United States, 451 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. 1968); Robert L. Hamilton, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 430 (1974); Climate Control, Inc.,
43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 852 (1974).
101 United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969); Cairo Developers, Inc. v. United
States, 381 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
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A. Intent of the Taxpayer
This area includes the purpose for which the asset was acquired, the
purpose for which the property was held during the taxable year, and
the purpose for which the property was held at the time of sale. This
analysis is superficial in that it merely separates the question of intent
into three time periods. Certainly, the purpose for which the property
was originally acquired is sometimes relevant. 109 (There is a distinc-
tion between a person who originally buys the land to farm and a person
who buys the land contemplating development as a subdivision.) Much
greater emphasis, however, must be given to the time surrounding sale.
"A taxpayer's purpose can change during the course of his holding of
property, and in such cases it is the dominant purpose of his holding dur-
ing the period prior to the sale which is critical."'10  Past intent should
not be controlling when present activity indicates a different purpose.
The farmer may become a real estate developer and conversely the real
estate developer may find his subdivision floundering and sell off his
holdings in bulk. Neither individual's case should be prejudiced by his
former plans.
This measure of intent also fails to take into account the word "pri-
marily." No matter what point in time intent is assessed it must always
involve an assessment of the primary purpose of the taxpayer. Since
the tests formula was constructed long before Malat, its perspective has
been appended to but not incorporated into the equation. Consequent-
ly, the focus is on three time periods, whereas the statute is not as con-
cerned with the moment in time at which intent is determined, but whether
that intent was of first importance in the taxpayer's mind.
B. Activities of the Taxpayer
This area includes the extent and nature of the taxpayer's efforts to
sell the property, the use of a business office for the sale of the property,
the extent and nature of the taxpayer's business, and the frequency, num-
ber, and continuity of sales. These tests essentially address the question
of whether the taxpayer was in the trade or business of selling real
property.''
Illustrative of the weakness in the tests formula is the uneven appli-
cation of the frequency and continuity factors. A single sale may not
be enough to demonstrate the continuity and frequency of sales
See Hansche v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972) (originally bought for
farming); Jersey Land & Dev. Co. v. United States, CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX REP.,
U.S. TAX CAS. (75-1, at 86,935) 9386 (D. N.J. Mar. 20, 1975) (originally bought for
trucking business); Climate Control, Inc., 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 852 (1974) (originally
bought to develop apartments).
"'0 Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1966); see also Nadalin v. United States,
364 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1966); S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 299 (1966); Estate of Sam Broadhead,
41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993 (1972).
"' See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
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associated with a trade or business." 2  Beyond that little is clear how-
ever.
The decided cases are of little aid in establishing the "fre-
quency and continuity" of sales sufficient to constitute a regular
course of business. A total of 7 sales during the tax year was
held sufficient in George 1. Wibbelsman, 12 T.C. 1022 (1949),
while the sale of 95 subdivided lots in 2 tax years was held in-
sufficient in Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (C.A. 5. 1947).
Rather than apply a mechanical test, one approach is to deter-
mine whether the taxpayers were engaged in activity commonly
associated with a particular business."l 3
Undoubtedly the question of whether one is in the trade or business of
selling realty is important in deciding whether a capital asset was sold.
But the issue would be better framed by addressing the statutory language,
placing emphasis on the question of whether the gain arose from the
everyday operation of a business as opposed to profit realized upon ap-
preciation of the asset. Additionally, it highlights the issue of whether
the businesses of third-parties related to the taxpayer are attributable to
the taxpayer as his trade or business." 4 Advertising, promoting, and in-
dividual effort are significant, but they must be considered as having
been done in consummation of a sale in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer's business and not another's.
C. Purchase and Sale of Land
Lastly, there are tests relating to the circumstances surrounding the
particular tract in question such as the proximity of sale to purchase, the
extent of improvements, and the listing of the property with brokers.
Once again, the tests seem reasonable but their application is uneven.
Holding periods of less than a year have not prejudiced capital gains
treatment from profits reaped on sales of real property; 1 5 in contrast, a
holding period of seventeen years has been held insufficient." 16  Adver-
tising is also an unreliable factor since some properties may sell favorably
without it in a seller's market whereas individuals merely trying to rid
themselves of a bad investment might have to make an active effort to
promote what is obviously an unattractive piece of property. 17
In relation to the improvements factor there is some authority that,
absent unusual circumstances, land held for subdivision cannot be a
capital asset."" Moreover, there are contradictory statements: Improve-
112 George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120 (1966). But see Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812
(S.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd per curiam, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
113 Robert W. Pointer, 48 T.C. 906, 917 (1967), aff'd, 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969).
114 See text accompanying notes 131-38 infra.
115 Malat v. Riddell, 275 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
116 S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966).
17 Robert L. Adam, 60 T.C. 966 (1973), acquiesced in, 1973-23, CuM. BuLL. 6; Estate of Sam
Broadhead, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993 (1972).
I's Ridgewood Land Co., 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1973).
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ment alone will not render property a capital asset; there must be im-
provement plus promotion and sales-"' Thus, the dispositive signifi-
cance of improvements remains uncertain.
The tests never adequately take into account certain basic elements,
namely that the primary purpose must be sale to customers. Even if the
taxpayer is in the realty business, the sales must be in the ordinary course
of his business. Therefore, taken as a whole, the tests focus on a phrase
that is interpreted to read "property held by the taxpayer for sale con-
nected with a trade or business," whereas the phrase actually reads:
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business. When this is added to the
unpredictable application of the tests, it seems obvious that the Supreme
Court was wise to return to the text of the phrase and not engage in this
type of peripheral analysis. Merely identifying a few of the important
factors is not a satisfactory method for solving this complex problem.120
VI. COMMON PROBLEMS
Three recurring problems have surfaced in the last ten years since the
decision in Malat v. Riddell. These problems demonstrate the need for a
close textual reading of the Code sections. The first concerns the
"change of circumstance cases" where the realty sale was prompted by an
unexpected event. A second involves the "attribution cases" where the
activities of a separate entity or individual were attributed to the taxpayer,
with the result that the taxpayer was found to be in the same trade or
business as that entity or individual. Lastly, there are the "dealer and
developer cases" where a developer, subdivider, or real estate broker
desired to segregate property for purposes of investment apart from his
regular trade or business.
A. The Changed Circumstances Cases
As far back as 1936, taxpayers were advancing the contention that the
19 s.o. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966); Robert L. Hamilton, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 430 (1974);
see also Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd,
509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
120 The recent case of Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976),
reversing, 509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), strenuously defended the conventional lines of
reasoning by applying the seven factors. Judge Goldberg stated in the reversing opinion
that the task must begin with an evaluation of the main Winthrop factors. The opinion
continued by discussing prior investment intent and the Malat decision. The court held
that the taxpayer had held the property in question primarily for sale and any profit
therefrom was ordinary income.
The decision misconstrued both the opinion below and Winthrop. Winthrop began
by admitting its outright hostility to the tests formula finding themselves "'engulfed
in .. .a quagmire of unworkable, unreliable, and often irrelevant tests." 417 F.2d at
906. Winthrop did list the seven factors but gave them short shrift. The thrust of
Winthrop was an analysis of the direct statutory language of section 1221(1) breaking
it down into component parts as suggested in this article. The same is true of the
district court opinion in the case. Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp.
1331 (W.D.La. 1973). In the reversing circuit court opinion, Judge Rooney, in a specially
concurring opinion, incisively remarked that "the various indicia which the courts have
delineated are useful in applying the § 1221(1) test to the facts of a case, but should
not be regarded as a substitute for the statutory test." 526 F.2d at 424.
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sale of realty must yield capital gains when that sale was prompted solely
by a desire to liquidate an investment made unprofitable by a change in
circumstances.' 2' By recounting the changed circumstances, the tax-
payer had the advantage of objectively establishing the purpose for which
he held the land during the decisive period prior to sale. With Malat
holding that the purpose of sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business must be the primary purpose, this argument has new meaning.
A bare allegation that one is liquidating an unprofitable venture is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness in the Commis-
sioner's determination. 22  Moreover, if the liquidation is accompanied
by "extensive development and sales activity, the mere fact of liquidation
does not preclude the existence of a trade or business. ... 123 This
does not mean that the fact of sale in itself will jeopardize a liquidation; if
that were the case no one could ever liquidate a capital asset. 124 When
the liquidation sale or sales are accompanied by such extensive efforts
that it is actually the launching of a new enterprise, it will be found to
produce ordinary income.
The condemnation or threat of condemnation by eminent domain pro-
ceedings may also present changed circumstances which prompt the sale
of a capital asset. In two similar cases portions of land held by developers
were subject to eminent domain proceedings. In one case the land was
sold to the State Highway Department; 2 5 in the other it was sold to a
private party. 26  The same conclusion was reached in both instances;
the subject of the sale was considered a capital asset. As explained by
the Tax Court, "under the circumstances, we do not believe that the profit
realized by petitioner on this one isolated transaction [under threat of
condemnation] represents profits . .. arising from the everyday opera-
tion of a business."' 2 7 In contrast, the case of Juleo, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner28 held a sale to state authorities by a developer to be taxable as
ordinary income because the condemnation award reflected what would
have been received had the land been sold as developed property. This
opinion is clearly incorrect. There was never an attempt to grapple with
the issue of whether the sale was in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's
trade or business. That the taxpayer made the same amount of profit
as he would have made had he developed the land is not a fact crucial to
the classification of property as a capital asset. Rather, the circum-
stances surrounding the sale are more important.
121 Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1936); see also Ehrman v. Commissioner,
120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941).
122 John P. Vidican, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1191 (1969).
123 Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371, 1375 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971), citing White v. Commis-
sioner, 172 F.2d 629, 630 (5th Cir. 1949); see also Melvin R. Hansche, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1809 (1970), aff'd men., 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972).
124 Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
125 Tri-S Corp., 48 T.C. 316 (1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1968).
126 Ridgewood Land Co., 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1972), af'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1973).
127 Id. at 47.
1s 483 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1103 (1973).
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At times, profits from a realty sale prompted by the reversal of a busi-
ness decision will produce capital gains treatment. Illustrative is Climate
Control, Inc.129 A predecessor of Climate Control, Inc. had been in the
business of buying unimproved land, developing it, and selling the land
for residential purposes. One piece of property purchased had been set
aside for the purpose of building an apartment complex for rental. Ap-
plication for zoning changes and other efforts were made to complete the
project. An alert real estate broker and acquaintance of the principal
stockholder of the company which owned the property inquired if the
property was for sale. In a jocular manner, the stockholder affirmed that
it was. A sale was consummated with profit in excess of $100,000.00.
The Tax Court held the profit to be capital gain. Until the moment of
sale it had always been the business decision of the company to hold this
land for investment. Such was the primary purpose, objectively proven
by enumerating the steps taken to accomplish it. In another situation,
however, a taxpayer remained in the business of selling real estate despite
a change in his method of conducting business, namely, by disposing of
the property in a single transaction to a developer. The circumstances re-
vealed that after he changed his business method, he entered (albeit
through the developer as agent) a new business. 130
Factors other than those enshrined in the tests formula have a great
bearing on the outcome of such cases. Liquidation motives, condemna-
tion proceedings, and changes in business decisions are highly probative
with regard to defining the subject of sale as a capital or a non-capital
asset. If a list is desirable, it would be inappropriate not to give these
factors an enumerated status.
B. The Attribution Cases
A second common problem concerns attributing activities of third
parties to the taxpayer to prove that he engaged in a trade or business.
The Fifth Circuit in Snell v. Commissioner 31 first expressed the idea that
it is possible to conduct a realty sales business through others. This
concept is central to the issue of classifying real property as a capital
asset since a tax avoidance scheme could easily be devised by which the
taxpayer is isolated from those activities normally associated with a
trade or business by conducting such activities through multiple corpora-
tions.
The activities of a third party will be attributed to the taxpayer where
the third party is acting as agent for, or participating in a joint venture
with, the taxpayer. 32  Attribution of business activities is not made
129 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 852 (1974). See also Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl.
1966) (taxpayer who had first sold or developed approximately 100 lots in a subdivision
and sold the remaining 333 in a single sale received capital gains treatment on the pro-
ceeds).
130 Nadalin v. United States, 364 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1966); see also S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295
(1966).
131 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938). See text accompanying notes 20, 21 supra.
132 The "agency" theory was applied in H-H Ranch, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d
885 (7th Cir. 1966); Robert A. Boye, 58 T.C. 316 (1972) and C & A Land Co., 40 P-H Tax Ct.
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merely because the taxpayer has an interest in a corporation which en-
gages in real estate promotion or development. The corporation must
have acted on behalf of the taxpayer for the express purpose of advancing
the particular sale in question. 3
3
Illustratively, if the taxpayer sells the property but retains a stake in
the business venture, the activities of the development corporation to
which he sold may be imputed to him. 3 4  A sale at an inflated price,
siphoning off profits prior to development, is also indicative of a hand-in-
glove operation in which the activities of one entity should be imputed to
another. 135
Good business reasons must be furnished to justify conveyance to a
related third party. In Thomas A. Cary,136 a corporation conveyed prop-
erty to a syndicate which included the sole shareholder of that corpora-
tion. It was reacquired by the corporation at a substantial gain to the
syndicate. The syndicate's profits were treated as capital gain despite
the later development of the tract by the corporation. The Tax Court
was convinced that the original sale was consummated because of the
financial difficulties of the corporation and that the profit to the syndicate
was warranted since conditions had changed during the holding period,
making repurchase attractive to the corporation. Hence, adequate busi-
ness reasons precipitated both transactions.
Another variation of the attribution issue involves the interrelationship
between partners. It is unsettled whether all partners of a partnership
must be treated the same. One court arrived at the conclusion that it is
the partnership's purpose for holding the land which must be considered
and not the purpose of any one particular partner. 37 This would mean
that all partners either receive capital gains or ordinary income treat-
ment without distinction. Other courts have reasoned that the individual
partner's intent is the controlling factor and each partner may be a partic-
ipant for diverse reasons. 38
Mem. 1245 (1971). The "joint venture" theory was employed in Tibbals v. United States,
362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966) and Royce W. Brown, 54 T.C. 1475 (1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 197!).
133 It is established that, in determining the trade or business of an individual tax-
payer, the business activities of his closely-held corporation will not be attributed
to him, but it is also true that a taxpayer may be individually in the same busi-
ness as his corporation, may make that business his own, or may utilize the
company in his own business. It is therefore appropriate, in circumstances such
as these, to see whether the taxpayer uses his controlled company - for instance,
as agent, co-participant, or joint venturer - to implement or further his own
personal business, as he easily can. That type of inquiry has often been made
by the courts, including this one, in cases testing (under § 117(a) of the 1939
Code or § 1221 of the 1954 Code) whether profit from a sale of property was
ordinary income or capital gain.
Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (citations omitted).
134 Nadalin v. United States, 364 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1966); see also George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C.
120 (1966), acquiesced in, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 2, acquiescence withdrawn, 1970-2 Cum. BULL.
22.
135 Robert A. Boyer, 58 T.C. 316 (1972).
136 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 881 (1973).
131 Estate of Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845
(1968); see also William B. Dean, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 969 (1974).
'3 Riddell v. Scales, 406 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1969), citing United States v. Rosebrooks, 318
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The attribution question is not specifically listed among the tests
formula except to the extent that the employment of a real estate broker
will be considered. Again, a significant aspect of the capital/non-capital
asset dispute is inadequately formulated in the tests approach.
C. The Dealer and Developer Cases
The last common situation is the segregation of investment properties
by a real estate dealer or developer from his inventory of properties held
for sale to customers. The Commissioner has argued that a real estate
broker has a greater burden of proof when confronting this situation.
1 3 9
The reasoning is that since a real estate broker or developer is engaged in
the trade or business of selling realty, he should be compelled to submit
a greater quantity of evidence as to the investment nature of his dealings.
This argument has been rejected by some courts. A person engaged in
the business of holding real estate need not supply more than the normal
quantity of evidence to prove that a particular property was not held for
sale in the ordinary course of his business. 40  Accordingly, a real estate
broker or developer may simultaneously hold some property for sale in
the ordinary course of his business and some for investment.'
41
Whatever the burden of proof, the difficulty remains to evince the in-
vestment intent. Mere self-serving statements are not satisfactory;
42
the intent should be demonstrable through objective facts. The recent
case of Richard H. Pritchett a'4 presented such a situation. Pritchett was
a real estate broker who occasionally purchased real estate in his own
name for his own account. The gain from sale of these properties
contributed significantly to his annual income. Over a four year period
he had completed more than twenty-five sales for his own account. The
Commissioner challenged the gain realized on four of those sales, con-
sidering it to be ordinary income. The Tax Court found in all four in-
stances that the taxpayer had correctly characterized the gains. All were
less-than-anxious sales. Three of the four involved no solicitation of
buyers through advertising, or through Pritchett as a broker. In one in-
stance, Pritchett had plans to develop one tract as a trailer park but was
unable to obtain financing, forcing abandonment of the plans. A very
close factual question involved a sale to an individual who had first
approached Pritchett for his services as a real estate broker. The court
found, however, that the sale was not made by Pritchett in his capacity as
F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963). What is most confusing is that these cases (Freeland and
Scales) were decided in the same circuit without attempt to distinguish one from the
other; hence, attribution of intent among partners remains unresolved.
13' See Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184, 188 (8th Cir. 1967); Scheuber v.
Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967), cited in Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner,
supra.
140 Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967).
I4' ld.; Myers v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 197,202 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d
1393 (5th Cir. 1973); Richard A. Pritchett, 63 T.C. 149 (1974); Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C.
1278 (1970).
142 See Myers v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 197, 211 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 469
F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1973).
63 T.C. 149 (1974).
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a dealer. The taxpayer had always scrupulously segregated his activities
as dealer and investor, the latter being conducted through a partnership and
corporation, while the former activity was conducted in an individual
capacity.
The tests formula does not properly conceptualize the problem. The
listed tests concentrate on the "trade or business" aspect as devised
when the sole question considered by courts was whether the taxpayer
engaged in the trade or business of selling real estate. The "ordinary
course" concept which allows a broker to separate sales into two cate-
gories - investment and inventory - is secondary. Since "the funda-
mental objective of the capital gains provisions [is to grant] preferential
treatment to gains realized from those transactions which are not the
normal source of business income,"1 44 the two-step process of first, find-
ing if the taxpayer is in the realty business and second, determining
whether the particular sale was in the ordinary course of that business
more accurately reflects the statutory scheme.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This branch of income tax law has had a checkered history. Since
the Depression the issue has been whether the property sold is excluded
from the definition of capital asset by the phrase "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business." If so excluded, any resulting profit is ordinary income.
Originally, the sole question was whether the taxpayer was in the trade or
business of selling real estate. With time, the courts recognized a host of
factors which might influence the outcome. Certain of those factors be-
came entrenched in a formalistic approach to the problem which proved
unreliable, spawning contradictory results. Litigation was legion, yet the
case law failed to produce workable guidelines.
The Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell made its sole comment on the
issue concluding that the word "primarily" as used in the statute meant
"of first importance." Significant was the methodology which the Court
employed, eschewing the tests formula and using a textual analysis of
the identical phrase contained in sections 1221(1) and 1231(b)(1)(B).
Some courts have followed this lead but remain in the minority. Reli-
ance is still placed in substantial part upon the tests formula.
A close scrutiny of that exclusionary phrase identifies some import-
and concepts which are not adequately considered in the tests formula.
First, proper emphasis must be given to the word "primarily." Second,
the oft-forgotten word "customers" is revived as part of the phrase.
Third, the concept of selling in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's
business is given importance equal to the concept of engaging in such a
"trade or business." Lastly, there is recognition of the fact that the
business must be his (that is, the taxpayer's) trade or business.
There can be little doubt that the tests identify some significant and
highly relevant factors. Other factors, however, are of equal importance
'I" Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278, 1287 (1970).
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and there is little reason for not including them in a list of probative
factors. A review of the cases since the Malat decision illustrates the
problems arising from their absence. In some instances an unusual change
in circumstances must be taken into account. Factors of liquidation, con-
demnation of the property, or a reversal of business plans are equal to any
of the enumerated tests in reaching a result. At other times, the attribu-
tion of the activities of any entity related to the taxpayer becomes deter-
minative. Lastly, when a real estate developer or broker desires to segre-
gate land for investment purposes, the tests formula does not properly
consider the concept of sales in the ordinary course of business.
This article does not suggest that the tests should be abolished. The
tests contain indispensable elements which must be considered by a court
deciding the capital/non-capital assets issue in relation to a realty sale.
Listing the factors, however, is not enough; there must be an attempt to
fulfill the objectives of the statutory scheme, relating the enumerated
factors to the concepts embodied in the language of the statute. More-
over, the tests must not be employed as primary indicators to the exclu-
sion of other relevant points. Relating all factors to the interpretation of
the plain meaning of the phrase "property held by the taxpayer for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" will give
substance to the congressional intent embodied in that language.
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